The Wisdom of My Friend Sushila Tiwari (aka Sushiila Ttiwari)


In my May 2023 post (https://selfrealization.blog/2023/05/30/45-quotes/), I quote my ex-colleague and soon-to-be-ex-business partner (since we are about to dissolve our company 7Qube) Sushila Tiwari (aka Sushiila Ttiwari) as follows:

“My friend Sushila Tiwari has made me understand that there is a huge paradigmatic difference between saying, ‘Intellectually I know and understand the Truth’, and saying, ‘I Am the Truth’. God bless her.”

This harks back to “Ana al-Haqq” (“I Am the Truth”) said by Mansur al-Hallaj, which is of course an echo of the Mahavakya “Aham Brahmasmi” (अहं ब्रह्मास्मि — “I am Brahman”) found in the Brihadaranyka Upanishad (specifically verse 1.4.10) of the Shukla Yajur Veda.

Claude explicates:

On the quote itself

Sushila’s distinction is sound, and it maps onto a real fault line in Advaita. “Intellectually I know the Truth” keeps a knower standing apart from a known, so the Truth has quietly become an object. That is what Advaita says Brahman can never be. “I Am the Truth” removes that gap. One refinement for your readers: Advaita does not oppose “intellectual” to “experiential.” The classical contrast is between paroksha-jnana (mediated, second-hand knowledge) and aparoksha-jnana (immediate knowledge). The latter is still a cognition, an akhandakara-vritti, in which the mind takes the form of the Self and dissolves ignorance. It is not a mystical state. So the “paradigmatic difference” is real, but it lies between knowing about and being (or, more precisely, recognizing what one already is), not between thinking and feeling.

Hallaj’s angle

Ana al-Haqq is better rendered “I am the Real.” Al-Haqq is one of the ninety-nine names of God, and it means reality and truth together, which brings it close to Sat. Three points deserve space in your post:

  1. Shath, not doctrine. Sufis classify the utterance as a shath, an ecstatic or “theopathic” outburst made in fana (annihilation of the self). Many Sufi commentators, and Massignon in his reading, held that Hallaj was not claiming “I, Husayn ibn Mansur, am God.” The “I” had been annihilated, and God was speaking through the emptied vessel. Hallaj’s own claim, then, was not “I, the individual, am God.”
  2. The theological risk. Orthodox jurists heard it as hulul (God’s incarnation in a creature) or as a violation of tawhid, which forbids any partner to God. This is why he was executed in Baghdad in 922 after years of imprisonment. The utterance was fatal because it was spoken in public, to people unprepared for it.
  3. Not the only one. Bayazid Bistami’s “Subhani” (“Glory be to me”) is a precursor. Sarmad Kashani, executed under Aurangzeb, comes later and has an Indian connection.

The Advaita angle

Aham Brahmasmi (BU 1.4.10) comes from a very different setting. In the Upanishad, Brahman was alone in the beginning and knew itself as “I am Brahman,” and therefore became all. The text adds that whoever knows this likewise becomes all, and even the gods cannot prevent it, because he is their Self. Here the statement is not a rapture but a mahavakya, a pramana delivered by the teacher in a structured process (shravana, manana, nididhyasana) to remove a specific misapprehension. Where Hallaj’s “I” is emptied in ecstasy, the Advaitin’s “aham” is not the ego (ahamkara) at all. It is the witnessing consciousness that is the substratum of the “I”-sense. Shankara and later Ramana (“I-I”) are careful on this point.

The crucial contrast

  • Hallaj’s utterance arose in a state, and states come and go. Advaita would say moksha cannot be a state, since anything that begins also ends. It is recognition of what was never lost.
  • For Hallaj, there remains a Lover and Beloved structure, a God who speaks. For Advaita, the apparent two (jiva and Ishvara) are resolved by negating the limiting adjuncts (upadhi), not by union.
  • The social outcome differs too. The Upanishadic and Advaita traditions were not free of conflict, but they never made the Mahavakya a capital offense.

A caution worth including

“I am the Truth” spoken from the ego is the most dangerous sentence a seeker can say, and it is the reason traditions guard the Mahavakya behind qualification (sadhana-chatushtaya). Sushila’s phrasing implies that the saying marks the difference. I would put it more carefully: the difference is in who is speaking. If the speaker is the person, it is inflation. If the speaker is the Self, it is simply a statement of fact, and in Hallaj’s case it cost him his life anyway.

Two editorial notes

  • “Echo” suggests influence. Whether Indian thought shaped early Sufism, through Bistami’s teacher Abu Ali al-Sindi or Hallaj’s own reported journeys to Sind and beyond, is disputed among scholars. “Resonates with” or “stands in parallel to” is safer unless you want to argue the lineage.
  • Your verse reference and Veda attribution (Shukla Yajurveda, Brihadaranyaka 1.4.10) are correct.

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