My prompt to Claude:
Comment on and explicate these themes from multiple angles and historical contexts and not just modern psychiatry as it obtains today, kind of taking into consideration the whole range of human experience, the way Alain de Botton does, including say the likes of Foucault as in his “Madness and Civilization”:
“Mental illness is a sane response to an insane society.”–Paraphrase of RD Laing’s Views
“It is no measure of health to be well adjusted to a profoundly sick society.”–J. Krishnamurti
Claude’s Response:
Two aphorisms, two different claims
Both lines are paraphrases, as your notes already say, but they are not the same claim, and the difference matters.
The Laing paraphrase is about the sufferer: the distress, even the delusion, is an intelligible response to an unlivable situation. The Krishnamurti line is about the standard of health itself: adjustment is not evidence of wellness, because what you are adjusted to may be sick. Together they make a pincer. The “ill” may be responding sanely, and the “well” may merely be conforming.
Neither claim licenses its converse, and this is where the aphorisms usually get abused. It does not follow that every distressed person is perceiving truly, or that every adjusted person is diseased. A man who sets himself on fire in protest has told us something about the world, but not necessarily something wise about fire. The aphorisms are best read as correctives to complacency, not as diagnostic criteria.
The long history of ambivalence
Before there was psychiatry, there was a much older and more divided human view of madness.
Greece. In the Phaedrus, Plato’s Socrates says the greatest goods come to us through a divine madness, which he divides into prophecy, ritual purification, poetry, and love. The Hippocratic writers, meanwhile, were already naturalising the “sacred disease,” arguing that epilepsy had bodily causes. The pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata asks why men of genius so often run to melancholy. The tragedians add a darker point: in the Bacchae, it is Pentheus, the rational king who refuses to acknowledge the irrational, who is really mad, and his repression destroys him. That is arguably the first “insane society” drama.
The medieval world held madness in two registers at once: demonic possession on one side, and the holy fool and the mystic on the other, people whose strangeness was read as nearness to something real. Hildegard’s visions and Margery Kempe’s weeping were interpreted by a community that had a category for them.
The Renaissance gave us Erasmus’s Praise of Folly, Don Quixote, and Lear’s Fool, all figures who speak truth precisely because they are licensed to be unreasonable. In Cervantes especially, it is never clear that the sane world around the knight is saner than he is.
Foucault: the history of the division itself
Foucault’s Madness and Civilization (1961) asks a different question from Laing’s. He is not saying madness is sane. He is saying that “reason” and “madness” are not timeless categories but a division drawn historically, by the side with the power to draw it.
His narrative runs roughly like this. Madness in the Renaissance still had a tragic, cosmic, truth-bearing dimension (the Narrenschiff, the ship of fools). With the founding of the Hôpital Général in Paris in 1656, the unreasonable were confined alongside the poor, the idle, and the vagrant, as a matter of social order rather than medicine. Pinel’s and Tuke’s celebrated “liberation” of the insane, Foucault argues, replaced iron chains with internalised ones: the asylum taught the patient to feel watched, guilty, and obedient to a paternal doctor, and the cure was a moral reeducation into bourgeois norms.
Honesty requires two caveats. Historians such as Roy Porter and Andrew Scull have shown that the “Great Confinement” was patchier and less coherent than Foucault’s sweep suggests. And Derrida’s early critique (“Cogito and the History of Madness”) pointed out that Foucault, in trying to give madness its own voice, was still writing in reason’s language. But the central insight survives these objections: what counts as sickness is never decided by nature alone.
The sharpest vindications of the Krishnamurti line come from psychiatry’s own record. Samuel Cartwright’s “drapetomania” (1851) classified the desire of enslaved people to flee as a mental disease, so a well-adjusted slave was the healthy one. Homosexuality stayed in the DSM until 1973. Soviet psychiatrists, under Snezhnevsky’s elastic category of “sluggish schizophrenia,” diagnosed dissidents as ill for failing to adjust to the regime. In each case, health was defined as fitting in.
The modern critics
The twentieth century turned the suspicion into a literature. Nietzsche had already said that madness is rare in individuals but the rule in groups, parties, nations, and ages. Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents argued that civilisation is purchased with instinctual renunciation, and he even wondered aloud whether whole cultures might be called neurotic. Durkheim’s anomie, Weber’s iron cage, and Marx’s alienation each described a way a social order could produce suffering as a by-product.
Erich Fromm’s The Sane Society gave the cleanest conceptual tool: the pathology of normalcy, a “socially patterned defect” that goes unfelt because everyone shares it. Its logical core is the fallacy of “consensual validation”: the assumption that if everyone agrees, the thing must be sane. Szasz attacked the medical model as a category mistake, Goffman described the asylum as a total institution, and Bateson’s “double bind” gave Laing his theory of how contradictory family messages could make a self come apart. More recently, Mark Fisher and Byung-Chul Han have argued that late capitalism privatises what is collective: it hands us burnout and depression as individual defects when they are, in part, structural responses.
What Indian and other traditions add
Here the comparison gets more interesting, because several traditions saw what Laing saw but with a crucial difference.
The Advaita tradition describes the realised sage, in a verse of the Vivekachudamani, as behaving like a child, a madman, or a ghoul (bālonmatta-piśācavat), and the Bhagavata says similar things. Ramakrishna’s years of ecstatic disorientation, Chaitanya’s divya-unmāda (divine madness), Mirabai, and the avadhutas all belong here. The Sufis have the majnun of Layla and Majnun; Tibetan Buddhism has the “crazy wisdom” of figures like Drukpa Kunley. The Gita (2.69) puts the inversion neatly: what is night to all beings is day to the awakened one, and the reverse.
But these traditions do not simply equate madness with insight. Ayurveda carries a fully medical category of unmāda with ordinary causes. And the spiritual literature is careful to distinguish the sage from the lunatic, usually by the fruit: equanimity, coherence, and capacity to function and to love. A line often attributed to Joseph Campbell (who credited it to a psychiatrist; yet another unsettled attribution) captures it: the mystic swims in the same waters in which the schizophrenic drowns.
Cultures that have a place for the shaman’s illness, the call that arrives as a breakdown, give the crisis a destination. Laing’s idea of breakdown as potential breakthrough, and the “journey” at Kingsley Hall, is essentially the shamanic model transplanted into a society with no shamans, no initiators, and no one trained to accompany the voyager home. That may explain both its appeal and its fragility. A road with no guide and no map is as likely to end in a ditch as in an initiation.
The real philosophical fork
Beneath all of this lies one question: is there a vantage point from which a society can be called insane?
Laing, Fromm, and Krishnamurti say yes: an authentic self, a universal human nature, or a mind free of conditioning. Foucault is deeply suspicious of any such neutral ground, because every claimed outside turns out to be another position inside history. Advaita offers a third answer. The ground is neither the socially constructed ego nor an “authentic” individual personality, but the witnessing awareness prior to both. That is why the tradition can treat ordinary waking life, with its ambitions and fears, as already a collective dream without declaring everyone clinically ill. It is a metaphysical claim, not a diagnostic one, and the two should not be collapsed.
Krishnamurti adds a subtle twist. The rebel, too, is conditioned: the counterculture has its own conformity. His answer is neither to adjust nor to revolt but to see the conditioning clearly as it operates in oneself, which is why his line is about the individual’s transformation and not about indicting the social order from outside.
Where this leaves us (the de Botton question)
The practical consolation is real. For anyone who has felt out of step with a hurried, acquisitive, or cruel environment, these aphorisms say that unease may be perception rather than defect. That is permission to take one’s own alienation seriously.
The danger is that the same sentence flatters. “I am too sensitive for this world” can be discernment, or it can be a symptom that deserves treatment, and it can be both. Modern research suggests something like a middle position: social adversity, migration, urban upbringing, and trauma measurably raise the risk of psychosis and depression, which partly vindicates the social side of Laing, while the vulnerability itself has large genetic and neurobiological components, which limits him. (Mark Vonnegut, whose memoir The Eden Express is said to have popularised the Krishnamurti line, later wrote of his own breakdown in far more biological terms, as I recall.) Even “depressive realism” findings, that mildly depressed people can judge some things more accurately, cut both ways: accuracy is not the same as being able to live.
So a few questions are more useful than the aphorisms themselves. Does the person suffer, and can the suffering be eased? Can they love, work, and remain in contact with others? Is their perception open to correction? Does the society’s norm, in this instance, serve human flourishing or only its own continuity? The aphorisms are good at the last question and poor at the first three. A humane view needs both: the humility to ask what a “disorder” is adjusting to, and the seriousness to treat those who are drowning as drowning.
If it would be useful, I could shape this into a blog essay, perhaps one focused on the Advaita-versus-Foucault fork, which seems the most original thread here.
Check out the “Advaita-versus-Foucault fork” in my next post.