I asked Claude: How would Plato’s Theory of Forms (or Theory of Ideas) connect the love in this world with the love as it obtains in the Form of The Good?
Claude replied:
The premise needs one correction first. In Plato, love is not something that exists in the Form of the Good. Eros, as Diotima explains in the Symposium, is the child of Poros (resource) and Penia (poverty): it is desire, and desire implies lack. The Good lacks nothing, so it does not love. It is the object toward which all love is directed. The connection you ask about therefore runs through the structure of desire rather than through a shared quality of love at two levels.
Participation. A beloved person is beautiful because they participate in the Form of Beauty. The lover’s attraction is real, but it is attraction to a reflection. Beauty is the one Form that shines through the sensible world, as the Phaedrus (250d) says, and that is why beauty is the occasion on which eros awakens in us. Beauty is only the doorway, though. Diotima says eros is ultimately the desire to possess the good, and to possess it forever (206a). The Republic generalizes this: every soul pursues the Good and does everything for its sake, though it divines this only dimly (505d-e). Every particular love is thus a confused, partial version of the one love of the Good. We take the beloved to be the end when they are a mediating image of it.
Ascent and recollection. The Symposium gives this a structure: the ladder from one beautiful body, to all bodies, to souls, to laws and institutions, to knowledge, and finally to Beauty itself, glimpsed suddenly. The Phaedrus gives it a different mechanism, anamnesis. The lover sees in the beloved a trace of what the soul saw before incarnation, and this regrows the soul’s wings. Because the Republic places the Good beyond being, as the source of the being and intelligibility of all the Forms, Beauty and Good converge at the summit. Love ascends because the Good is both its origin and its destination.
The unresolved problem. Gregory Vlastos famously objected that the ladder makes persons into stepping stones. What is loved is the Form as instantiated, and the individual is discarded once they have served. Alcibiades’ speech about Socrates, placed right after Diotima’s, reads almost like Plato testing his own theory: Alcibiades loves Socrates as a particular man, and the ladder has no place for that. The Phaedrus partly repairs this, since the lover there cherishes and shapes the actual person in the likeness of the god they followed. Martha Nussbaum reads the two dialogues as a real tension in Plato rather than a harmony. I think the tension is genuine, and it is the cost of the theory: if the particular is loved only by way of its participation, the particular’s irreducibility is never fully honored.
Where something like divine love does appear. The nearest Plato comes to love on the side of the Good is the Timaeus (29e). The demiurge made the world because he was good, and the good is without envy, so he wanted everything to be as like himself as possible. This is generosity, an overflow of being without need. Later Platonists, Plotinus especially, built on it, so the idea that goodness is self-diffusive, the One overflowing, comes from this line of thought rather than from the Symposium. In that sense there is a downward movement answering the upward one: eros ascends through lack, while the Good gives without lack. But Plato never says the Good loves.
The short answer is that this-worldly love is the Good acting as a magnet through its reflections: eros is the soul’s pull toward the source of all value, and each particular love is that pull caught at a low rung.