Who Can Call a Society Insane? Advaita, Foucault, and the Problem of the Vantage Point — Claude’s Essay


The question beneath the aphorism

To call a society insane, you need somewhere to stand, and the aphorisms of Laing and Krishnamurti never quite say where. (“Mental illness is a sane response to an insane society.”–Paraphrase of RD Laing’s Views / “It is no measure of health to be well adjusted to a profoundly sick society.”–J. Krishnamurti)

A diagnosis is a comparison. A physician calls a fever a fever against the body’s usual temperature; a psychiatrist calls a belief delusional against what the surrounding community holds to be true. But a whole society has no surrounding community to be compared with. If the standard is “what most people do,” the society is sane by definition. If the standard is something else, such as human flourishing, the authentic self, or reality as it is, then we must say what that something is, and how anyone reaches it without having been shaped by the very society under judgment.

Three serious answers have been given. The humanist answer, shared in different forms by Laing, Fromm and Krishnamurti, says there is an authentic human nature or an unconditioned mind against which distortion can be measured. Foucault’s answer is that there is no such outside: every standpoint is itself a product of history and power. Advaita Vedanta gives a third answer, easily mistaken for the first and closer in spirit to the second: it points to a ground that is not a standpoint at all.

This essay sets the second and third against each other. They agree on more than their followers usually admit, and they part at exactly the point that matters most for how we treat people who are suffering.

Foucault: there is no outside

Foucault’s first move is to refuse the question: Madness and Civilization (1961) does not argue that the mad are sane, but that “reason” and “madness” were divided from each other by a historical act, performed by the side with the power to divide.

In his account, the late medieval and Renaissance world kept unreason inside the common conversation. The fool, the ship of fools, Erasmus’s Folly and Lear’s Fool could still say something true, because madness had a voice. Then, with the founding of the Hôpital Général in Paris in 1656, the mad were confined together with the poor, the idle and the criminal. That was a policy of order, not of medicine. Pinel’s and Tuke’s celebrated reforms then struck off the chains but installed conscience: the patient learned to watch himself, to feel guilt, and to defer to the doctor as a moral father. A dialogue between reason and madness became a monologue of reason about madness.

The later books generalise the point. In Discipline and Punish and the first volume of The History of Sexuality, power does not only forbid; it produces. It manufactures the kinds of person that its own knowledges then describe, such as the delinquent, the hysteric and the “homosexual,” and it relocates the watching eye inside the watched. On this view, the question “is this society sane?” has no neutral court of appeal, because the categories of sanity were assembled inside the society being judged.

As history, the book remains contested; Scull and Porter showed the “Great Confinement” was patchier than Foucault’s sweep implies. As a method, it is hard to unlearn. After reading him, one can no longer treat a line between the normal and the pathological as simply discovered.

The humanist wager, and why Foucault distrusts it

Laing, Fromm and Krishnamurti each bet that beneath the socially produced personality something truer survives, and that the truth of a society can be read off its damage to that something.

For Laing, it is the real self against the false-self system described in The Divided Self. For Fromm, it is a set of universal human needs, among them relatedness, rootedness and a frame of orientation, against which a culture can be audited, and which allows him to speak of a “pathology of normalcy.” For Krishnamurti, it is a mind unconditioned by tradition and authority, reached by observation without a chooser.

Foucault would hear this as the most seductive plot in the modern repertoire: a liberation story in which power is an external oppressor and the self is the true prisoner within. His suspicion is that the story is itself one of power’s best instruments. “Be yourself” is among the most heavily administered injunctions of our age, through therapy, confession, coaching and the self-help shelf, and the “true self” it promises is partly manufactured by the practices that claim to uncover it.

Krishnamurti is a partial exception, and deserves to be treated as one. He insists that the observer is the observed, and that the self to be liberated is itself conditioning. He would refuse the label, but his method of negation, which dissolves every candidate for “who I really am,” has more in common with the Advaitic neti neti than with Laing’s hidden authentic person. If the humanist wager fails, Laing’s aphorism loses its measuring stick. Krishnamurti’s survives, but only if what he points to is not a self at all.

Advaita’s third answer: a ground that is not a standpoint

Advaita agrees that every standpoint is a construction, and then asks what is aware of the construction.

Shankara opens his commentary on the Brahma Sutras with adhyāsa, superimposition: the beginningless habit of taking the body, the mind and the roles one occupies to be the “I,” and of taking awareness to be a property of the personality. The ego, the social self, the sane citizen and the labelled patient all belong to the superimposed. In Foucault’s vocabulary, Advaita is a theory of how a subject is made, with the difference that it is made out of a mistake and not out of power.

What remains when the superimposition is subtracted is the sākṣī, the witness. It is not a position in the world from which the world is viewed. A viewpoint can itself be objectified and examined, and whatever can be examined belongs to the seen (dṛśya), not the seer (draṣṭā). So the witness is not a “view from nowhere” in the philosophers’ phrase; it is not a view at all. This answers Foucault’s objection in advance. There is indeed no outside, but awareness is not outside in the way a place is.

This is why the tradition can say that ordinary waking life, with its common ambitions and fears, is a shared dream (Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā on the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad argues the case) without declaring everyone clinically ill. The Gita (2.69) compresses the inversion: what is night to all beings is day to the one who is awake.

But Advaita does not dissolve the working order of the world. It distinguishes the vyāvahārika, the level of transaction where law, medicine and ethics bind us, from the pāramārthika, the ultimate. Society is mithyā, neither simply real nor simply unreal, and at the level of transaction its suffering must be treated as real. The claim is metaphysical, not diagnostic. It tells you what you are; it does not tell you who is ill.

Where the two meet

Both deny that the ordinary “I” is a foundation, and both treat freedom as work done on the self, not a fact discovered about the world.

In his late lectures, The Hermeneutics of the Subject (1981–82), Foucault defines “spirituality” as any practice by which the subject transforms itself in order to gain access to truth. Antiquity, he argues, assumed that truth costs the seeker a transformation, until modern philosophy decided that knowledge alone was enough. This is very close to the Vedantic condition of adhikāra: the student must first be made fit, through discrimination, dispassion, the sixfold discipline and a longing for release, before the teaching can land. Foucault’s askesis and the Vedantic sādhana are cousins.

Both are also suspicious of the ready-made identity. Foucault ends The Order of Things by suggesting that “man” is a recent invention that may vanish like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea. The Advaitic cousin of that thought is that the person is a transient notion laid over awareness. And both distrust the authority that tells you who you are: Foucault’s doctors and experts on one side, and on the other a Vedantic method of adhyāropa-apavāda, in which scripture and teacher are used as a ladder, provisionally superimposed so that they can be withdrawn.

The mechanisms differ, and the difference is useful. Adhyāsa is beginningless and universal, a structural error of every embodied mind. Foucault’s subject-making is historical and plural, varying with epoch and institution. Foucault can tell you how this society manufactured this kind of well-adjusted person; Advaita tells you what is always being manufactured from. Anyone wondering why the model citizen of a hurried, acquisitive age often feels quietly unwell could use both.

Where they part: liberation or practices of freedom

Foucault offers no ground, only a more skilful way of moving; Advaita offers a ground, but at the price of a discipline and a test.

In a late interview Foucault drew a distinction between liberation and practices of freedom. Liberation suggests a final state in which a hidden nature is released, and he distrusted it. For him resistance is always local and immanent, a “counter-conduct”: the refusal to be governed in this way, at this cost. Advaita, by contrast, claims a final recognition, mokṣa, which is not a practice but the end of the need for one.

Pierre Hadot, the historian of ancient spiritual exercises, put this disagreement to Foucault directly. He found Foucault’s care of the self too aesthetic, a fashioning of one’s life as a work of art, and too little a movement beyond the self toward a view of the whole, what the Stoics and Platonists called the view from above. Hadot’s objection is, in effect, the Vedantic one.

Because Advaita makes so large a claim, it has to supply a way of telling the sage from the sufferer, and it does so by the fruit. The sthitaprajña of the Gita’s second chapter is marked by steadiness, freedom from hatred and fear, and action without grasping. The old Vedantic saying that the knower may behave like a child, a madman or a ghoul describes how such a person may appear to the world. It is not a licence for anyone who appears that way. Ayurveda, meanwhile, treats unmāda as a genuine illness with causes and remedies.

So on its own terms Advaita neither sacralises nor pathologises madness. The witness in the psychotic is as untouched as the witness in the sage. What differs is the condition of the instrument, the mind, and an instrument can be ill and deserves care.

The danger on each side

Each answer fails in a characteristic way, and the failures are mirror images.

Foucault’s is the failure of ground. Habermas and Nancy Fraser pressed the point: if all norms are products of power, on what basis does one resist anything? Foucault’s practical reply is that critique needs no metaphysical foundation to call something intolerable. The prison-information group he co-founded in 1971 gathered inmates’ testimony under that very word. The reply is honest, but it leaves the humane impulse resting on something close to taste. And a suspicion of the asylum, nourished partly by this literature, sat alongside real policy failures: where hospitals closed without the community care promised, many of the severely ill were left worse off, not freer.

Advaita’s failure is quietism. If the world is mithyā and the witness untouched, it is easy to hear “so adjust,” which is exactly the complaint in Krishnamurti’s line. History supplies the evidence. Shankara’s own commentary defends the exclusion of Śūdras from Vedic study, so a tradition with the deepest account of the self’s unity lived comfortably with caste at the level of transaction. There are counterexamples: Narayana Guru, a teacher in the Advaita line, built a movement against caste in Kerala, and Vivekananda turned Vedanta toward service of the poor. But they show that social critique had to be added by persons; the metaphysics did not deliver it. There is a commoner cruelty too, which is telling a depressed or psychotic person that their suffering is an appearance. At the level where they live, it is not.

A third danger is shared by both camps and by Laing’s own: romanticising breakdown. Kingsley Hall’s residents were sometimes travelling, and sometimes simply drowning, and a theory that cannot tell the two apart will fail the second group.

What follows

Humility about the norm and seriousness about the drowning are compatible, and the two traditions between them supply both.

From Foucault comes a habit of interrogation. When someone tells you what counts as healthy, ask who is drawing the line, what it costs, and who benefits, and ask it of the clinic, the family, the office and the counterculture alike. His remark that everything is not bad but everything is dangerous is a better working diagnostic than either aphorism.

From Advaita comes a discipline of aim. Turn the witness on your own certainty first. It is not a weapon to be pointed at others, since “you are conditioned, I am free” is one of the oldest conditioned sentences there is. And it brings a reminder from the level of transaction: where people lose sleep, work and one another, suffering is to be treated, and much of the treatment now available works.

The consolation on offer is modest. Someone who feels out of step with a hurried and acquisitive world may be perceiving something true, may be ill, or may be both. The two traditions do not teach how to decide which. They teach how to hold the question without cruelty in either direction, neither dismissing the unease as a defect nor crowning it as insight. The older tests remain the best ones: does the person suffer, and can it be eased; are they still in contact with others; can a friend still correct them?

The aphorisms ask us to doubt the world’s measure. The sage and the clinician, between them, ask us to stay kind while we do.

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